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Foreign Policy and the Separation of
Powers: Who Sets the Course
for the Ship of State?**
At the beginning of the present decade, before the Iran-Contra affair
had become a matter of national political controversy, Chairman Dante
Fascell of the House Foreign Affairs Committee announced that Con-
gress was an equal partner in foreign policy with the President of the
United States.' Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations and current political science professor, has referred in
her widely-syndicated newspaper column to a contest between the Leg-
islative and Executive Branches "over control of U.S. foreign policy."
2
On June 30, 1987, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed out
by a strict party vote of 10 to 9, a bill requiring the application of the
War Powers Act to the Persian Gulf, which sought to restrict the intro-
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1. Fascell, Congress and Foreign Polic, 7 CONG. STUD. 5, 7 (Winter 1980). A later,
toned-down view of the congressional role in foreign policy can be found in Fascell,
Congress and 4rmis Control, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 730, 731-33 (1987). Liberal historian
Arthur Schlessinger, Jr. goes so far as to claim: "In the field of foreign relations the
Constitution commands a partnership between the Legislature and the Executive."
Schlessinger, "The Legislative-Executive Balance in International Affairs: The Inten-
tions of the Framers," speech delivered at Conference on "The Constitutional Legis-
lative-Executive Relations in International Affairs," Center for Strategic and
International Studies (Washington, D.C., Sept. 15, 1986).
2. Kirkpatrick, Iran-Contra Affair: Policy Tug-of-ll'ar, The Blade (Toledo), July 6.
1987, at 8, col. 3.
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duction of United States Armed Forces into the Gulf when used as pro-
tection for both U.S. tankers and foreign ships reflagged as American
ships.3 This bill would have subjected all U.S. naval and air operations
in the Persian Gulf to the limitations of the War Powers Act, despite the
United States naval presence in that area for more than four decades.
The concept of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, and its subse-
quent amendments, 4 is at the very heart of the vigorous and continuing
debate over the original intent of the Framers,5 or what some prefer to
call the Constitution's original meaning. 6 The War Powers of the Presi-
dent, and the Congress, and their differing interpretations of the Sepa-
ration of Powers, were the primary focus of an especially acrimonious
controversy between the two Branches over the American presence in
the Persian Gulf and the reflagging of Kuwaiti ships. For example, Sen-
ator Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.), a highly respected spokesman on national
defense and national security issues and a leading critic of the Reagan
Administration in both areas, argued that reflagging represented "a mil-
itary policy which lacks strategic purpose and which is unlikely . . . to
receive sustained support from Congress and the people."'7 Despite
appearances, this is not a statement raising the question of Separation of
Powers. It is, instead, an indication of the periodic congressional desire,
usually manifested at a time of decline in presidential popularity, to con-
trol or micromanage foreign policy.
The question of who controls American foreign policy quickly
became a major issue at the Iran-Contra hearings in the summer of
1987. "Who's running the Government?," asked Senator Paul Sarbanes
(D.-Md.), during the testimony of Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
North.8 "Where," demanded Congressman Thomas Foley (D.-Wash.),
House Majority Leader, "is the accountability?" 9 To outside friends
3. See Persian Gulf and the War Powers Resolution, Report Together with Additional
Views, Comm. on Foreign Relations, S. REP. No. 106, 100TH CONG., IST SESS. 8 (JULY 10,
1987).
4. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1541-48 (1982).
5. See generally THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION
(The Federalist Society ed. 1986).
6. See Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of HistoiY in Constitutional Inteipretation,
31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 511-27 (1964).
7. Nunn, It Looks like Lebanon All Over Again, USA Today, July 15, 1987, at 8A,
col. 2. The Persian Gulf was given much attention by the television news media from
February, 1987, through April, 1988. Ironically, media coverage during most of the
1988 presidential primary campaign barely mentioned events in the Persian Gulf.
S.R. LICHTER, D. AMUNDSON & E.R. NOYES, THE VIDEO CAMPAIGN: NETWORK COVER-
AGE OF THE 1988 PRIMARIES 21 (1988).
8. The Blade (Toledo), July 16, 1987, at 6, col. 3. Iran-Contra refers to an alleg-
edly unlawful plan by members of the Reagan Administration to sell weapons to Iran
and use the profits to finance the operations of the Nicaraguan Resistance group
popularly known as the Contras.
9. Id. at col. 4. The Tower Commission, the independent presidential commis-
sion appointed by President Reagan to review the Iran-Contra Affair, clarified the
issue without resolution when it declared: "The Constitution places the President
and the Congress in dynamic tension." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAl. REVIEW
BOARD II-i (Feb. 26, 1987).
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and allies, including the quixotic French, the continuing struggle over
who should shape American foreign policy is as bewildering as it is fasci-
nating. One correspondent of the prestigious French daily newspaper,
Le Monde, viewed the special Iran-Contra hearings as an "unhealthy revi-
val of the eternal battle between the legislative and the executive for the
control of foreign policy."' 0 That battle, in fact, has been continually
waged since the earliest days of the Constitutional Republic."I
Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick maintains that even before the Iran-Contra
Select Committee Hearings, "[i]n foreign affairs particularly, Congress
has stretched the powers of the purse and of oversight beyond recogni-
tion or reason .... '1 2 Yet, she also suggests that the Framers would not
have been surprised by the hearings themselves, because the authors of
the Federalist Papers anticipated legislative encroachment. However, her
disappointment is manifest with the failure of the Reagan Administra-
tion to assert the Separation of Powers Doctrine more vigorously. 13
Senator William S. Cohen (R.-Me.), one of the most prominent
Select Committee Republican critics of the President and his aides in the
Iran-Contra affair, insists that the Founding Fathers intended govern-
mental powers to be diffuse, thereby creating an institutional system of
checks and balances. Cohen declares that "[t]he Founding Fathers
decided that power necessarily had to be entrusted to someone, but that
no one could be trusted with power."' 4 This is a felicitous phrase, even
if devoid of real meaning. Contrast the remark of the distinguished his-
torian of the Constitutional Convention, Clinton Rossiter, that the pro-
posed president was "to be a strong, dignified, largely nonpolitical Chief
of State and government."' 5 Concern over the use and potential abuse
of power did not prevent the Framers from providing an enduring sys-
tem of governance.
Former Congressman (R.-Ill.) and evanescent Presidential candi-
date, John B. Anderson, predicted at the beginning of August, 1987,
that as a result of the Iran-Contra Hearings, "Congress will be embold-
ened to serve as a coadjutor with the President in the design and execu-
tion of foreign policy.' 6 Clarification of this comment can be found in
Chairman Fascell's statement that Congress intends to co-manage
American foreign policy. 17 The House International Relations Commit-
tee (as it was called then) admitted this controversy's existence ten years
10. Kirkpatrick, Congress hnvades Reagan "s Thif, The Miami Herald, Aug. 2, 1987, at
3C, col. 3.
11. See the analysis ofJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL Law
189-93 (3d ed. 1983).
12. Kirkpatrick, supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. Cohen, han-Contra Hearings: They Taught Us A I'ahable Lesson About Proper,
Iproper Use of Power, The Miami Herald, Aug. 9, 1987, at 8F, cols. 1-2.
15. C. RoSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 221 (1968).
16. Anderson, A Chastening of Presidential Power, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 12, 1987,
Pt. II, at 5, col. 3.
17. See supra note 1.
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ago in a Committee Print, when it referred to a "continuing controversy
over the division of responsibility between Congress and the Executive
Branch on questions of policy management. ' ' I
According to John Anderson, a successful president must communi-
cate his ideas and defend his policies in order to "gain a consensus of
support from both the people and their representatives." 19 Here again,
Anderson is clearly in error, for his high-sounding words are not at all
indicative of how the system works. He is, in effect, proposing a parlia-
mentary style of governance, not the American Constitution's Separa-
tion of Powers. Anderson is not the only one to propose changing the
essence of our Constitution. An eminent legal scholar, Arthur S. Miller;
a prominent Washington lawyer from the Democratic Party, Lloyd Cut-
ler; and a distinguished journalist, Joseph C. Harsch, have advocated
transforming our political process into a parliamentary-type
democracy. 20
More appropriate to the functioning of our tripartite form of gov-
ernment is the observation of a UCLA sociology professor: "The effec-
tive president articulates his own goals first, then finds the mandate for
carrying them out. If he doesn't get it immediately, he won't abandon
his goals, for there is always a possibility that public opinion can be
brought into line through persuasion, education, or even manipula-
tion."' 2 1 In other words, presidents can rally public opinion to their spe-
cial cause by using what Theodore Roosevelt termed "the Bully
Pulpit."' 22
I. Separation of Powers and Original Meaning
The operation of checks and balances between the three major branches
of government is the concomitant result of the conscious creation by the
Framers of a Separation of Powers. The parameters of that separation
were left purposefully imprecise by the men of Philadelphia, though its
general outlines have always been discernible. It is, nevertheless, too
much to claim, as has one noted political scientist, that the constitutional
elements of the presidential office are "extraordinarily loose in defini-
tion," due in part to the Framers' reliance on the inevitable first Presi-
18. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., CON-
GRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY-1977 I (Comm. Print 1978) (quoting HousE COMM. ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY-
1976 1 (Comm. Print 1977)).
19. Anderson, supra note 16, at 5, col. 5.
20. Cf Bonafede, Reform of U S. System of Government Is on the 1finds and Agendas of
.Jlany, NATIONAL JOURNAL, June 29, 1987, at 1521-22, 1524; Harsch, Presidential 1Iork,
The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 25, 1987, at 11, col. 1; Miller, Impeach? .4 Hollow
Remedy, The Miami Herald, Aug. 2, 1987, at IC, col. 3; Lacayo, Holmes, & Ludtke, Is
It Broke? Should ll'e Fix It? Changing the Constitntion Is Not Easy, But Plenty of People Keep
Tinlg, TIME, July 6, 1987, at 54.
21. Alexander, Personal Politics, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 6, 1987, at 12.
22. SeeJ.D. BARBER, THE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN
THE WHITE HOUSE 5 (1972).
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dent, George Washington, "to invent a tradition as he went along." 2 3
The impressive figure of George Washington undoubtedly loomed
large in the delegates' minds as they fashioned Article II. Charles Mee,
who has written a well-received popular history of the Constitutional
Convention, gives cautious support to the notion that "the framers of
the constitution shaped the office of chief executive around Washington
... and would not have designed the office as they did had he not been
there to fill it." 24 Nevertheless there is no basis for the claim of former
White House Chief of Staff, and former Senate majority leader, Howard
Baker, that Congress does not have the right to "limit the president's
authority under the Constitution to administer the foreign policy of this
country." 25
This, of course, forms the crux of the debate over who makes for-
eign policy, who implements foreign policy, and who can place limita-
tions on foreign policy under the United States Constitution. Is foreign
policy merely within the purview of the Executive Branch? If so, why
does the Constitution vest the Legislative Branch with a role in the
treaty process and the authority to declare war?2 6 Why does the Judicial
Branch have the Article III right to decide cases involving ambassadors,
treaties, and disputes arising between the U.S. and another party?
27
Congress also controls the executive's ability to finance its foreign policy
activities.
No matter whose notes to the Convention debates are consulted,
there is not much debate beyond that on the war powers addressing for-
eign policy. The recently published Convention notes ofJohn Lansing,
Jr. reveal only five references to foreign policy issues between May 14
and July 10, 1787.28 These references fall into two categories-war and
treaties. 2 9 The treaty-making power was specifically raised by Alexander
Hamilton onJune 18th, given a priority status by Luther Martin's propo-
sal that treaties should be the supreme law of the land onJuly 17th, and
finally resolved, to all intents and purposes, on September 4th.30 The
question of making versus declaring war arose on August 17 and was
debated during that day and the next. The war-declaring power was
given to the Congress. The war-conducting power was left to the Execu-
23. Id. at 4.
24. C. MEE, THE GENIUS OF THE PEOPLE 118 (1987).
25. Quoted in Editorial, The Contras after Irananiok, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 28,
1987, at 7. This also seems to be the current position of Henry Kissinger and Cyrus
Vance. S. Graubard, Presidents: The Power and the lediocritv, The N.Y. Times Book
Review (Jan. 15, 1989), at 36-37.
26. U.S CONsT. art. I, § 8.
27. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.
28. SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 27, 50-51, 95, 120, 127 (1. Huston ed. 1987) [hereinafter FARRAND
SUPPLEMENT].
29. Id. During the 18th Century, the two categories were inextricably inter-
twined. See, e.g., S.F. BEMIS, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1957).
30. See T. FRANCK & M. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND SIMULATIONS 232-36 (1987).
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tive Branch; the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces. But the power of the purse in funding such activities also
remained with the Congress.
The limited number of references cited above does not mean that
foreign policy was not of significance as either an underlying cause for
the calling of the Convention or as a motivating factor for the creation of
the Constitution. Historian Frederick Marks, III makes a persuasive case
for concerns about foreign commerce, national defense, and freedom
from outside interference as being the major influences underlying the
calling of the Philadelphia Convention. 31 As Alexander Hamilton told
his colleagues on June 29, 1787, domestic tranquility could not be pre-
served until the American Government was respected abroad.3 2
Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania wrote Noah Webster on September
15, 1787, that without the Constitution the Philadelphia delegates had
developed "we shall become a prey to foreign influence and domestic
violence."3 3 Therefore, America had to be strong, and the real issue
was not whether there was a need to establish a firm foreign policy, but
rather who would set the course for the ship of state.
A close reading of the Federalist Papers, which remains the most
authoritative interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, reveals the Foun-
ders' willingness to allow the Executive, rather than the Legislature, to
make the major foreign policy decisions. The Legislature was a suspect
institution given the historic role of the British Parliament in the events
preceding the American Revolution. The British Monarch was both
actually and symbolically the maker and mover of the national interest in
foreign affairs. 34 The American Revolution was a dispute among
Englishmen, and the King was denounced for his internal transgres-
sions, not for his external relations. 35
From the earliest days of the Constitutional Republic, the battle has
been joined between the Legislative and Executive Branches over the
right of the latter to conduct an independent foreign policy. 36 The
struggle sometimes abates, but never ceases. 3 7 The bare bones of the
31. See generally F. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1986).
32. FARRAND SUPPLEMENT, supra note 28, at 127.
33. Id., at 273. See also Hamilton's statement in Federalist NVo. 24, which in refer-
ring to Britain and Spain cautions that "we should not be willing to be exposed in a
naked and defenseless condition to their insults and encroachments .. " THE FED-
ERALIST No. 24. at 162 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). He also makes refer-
ence to the dangers of foreign encirclement in FEDERALIST No. 25. Id. at 163 (A.
Hamilton).
34. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, id. at 419-20 (A. Hamilton).
35. Friedlander, Autonony and the Thirteen Colonies: WaTzs the American Revoluaton
Really .Vecessary?, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 507 (1980).
36. See, e.g., R.W. LEOPOLD, THE GROWrH OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 69-92
(1962).
37. See generally R. BOLLING, POWER IN THE HOUSE: A HISTORY OF TIHE LEADERSHIP
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1974). Cf Szamuely, The hiperial Congress, 77
COMMENTARY 27 (Sept. 1987). In a masterpiece of understatement, Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan observes that "Presidents find the role of Congress in foreign
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Constitution, as they pertain to foreign affairs, were fleshed out by the
first Presidents-Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and
Monroe-who by action and through precedent gave historic applica-
tion to constitutional theory. Nowhere is this more apparent than with
the Constitution's requirement that treaties shall be made by the Presi-
dent "with the advice and consent of the Senate ... "38
George Washington tried once, literally, to adhere to the explicit
language of the Constitution. On the 22nd of August, 1789, Washing-
ton went to the Senate Chamber with the intent of discussing seven pro-
positions contained in instructions he had given to a three-man
Commission assigned to negotiate a treaty with the Creek Indians of
Georgia.3 9 When the President arrived in the Senate Chamber, there
was a great deal of noise from the street and a good deal of confusion on
the Senate floor.40 The matter was therefore postponed until the fol-
lowing Monday. 4 1  President Washington eventually secured Senate
approval for all he requested after a lengthy debate. 4 2 Neither Washing-
ton nor any incumbent president had gone back to the Senate to seek its
assistance and approval as part of the treaty process. Since 1789, all
presidential communications to the Upper House with respect to trea-
ties have been made in writing.
Another experiment in advise and consent procedures took place
one hundred and thirty years later. On August 14, 1919, President
Woodrow Wilson invited the members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to have lunch with him in the East Room of the White
House.4 3 The subject of their luncheon discussion was the Treaty of
Versailles, which the Senate ultimately rejected. 44 At the luncheon, Wil-
son in effect became a witness before the Committee, testifying on the
nature and the origins of the Versailles Treaty, and especially comment-
ing on Article 10, which dealt with the controversial concept of collec-
tive security. 45 The President submitted himself to three and one-half
hours of intense interrogation by the Committee. The Committee, how-
ever, remained unsatisfied.4 6
No sitting President before or since has met in person with the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations. Neither the visit of George Wash-
ington to the Senate Chamber, nor the meeting of the Foreign Relations
Committee with Woodrow Wilson in the East Room, established prece-
affairs continually troublesome." Moynihan, The Modern Role of Congress in Foreign
Affairs, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1489, 1492 (1988). Moynihan has served on both the
Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees.
38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.





43. T. BAILEY, WOODROW WILSON AND THE GREAT BETRAYAL 84-85 (1945).
44. Id. at 72-85.
45. Id. at 85.
46. Id.
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dents or otherwise left an imprint on the treaty-making process. The
doctrine of Separation of Powers was not disturbed by these solitary
incidents.
The current and continuing Legislative-Executive wrangle over who
is in charge has put the system of checks and balances in the realm of
foreign policy at greater risk than they were during the two presidential
concessions to senatorial prerogatives. Despite many claims to the con-
trary advanced over the past 200 years,4 7 the treaty approval process
under our Constitution is a simple one. It has always been relatively
simple, and it should continue to be so.
In the treaty-making process envisioned by the Framers, the Presi-
dent proposes and the Senate disposes. As Alexander Hamilton wrote
in Federalist Mo. 75, "[t]o have intrusted the power of making treaties to
the Senate alone would have been to relinquish the benefit of the consti-
tutional agency of the President in the conduct of foreign negotia-
tions."'4 8 The Senate cannot remake a treaty after a treaty is made. It
cannot revise a treaty after its approval.49 The President submits a
treaty to the Senate; the Senate then votes it up or down, or adds
amendments, reservations, declarations, or understandings. The Senate
can also direct the President to act, or refrain from acting, before he
ratifies the treaty that it has approved, or modified, through a resolution
of ratification.50
Nevertheless, the Senate is not in the treaty-making business.
According to the traditional view of the Separation of Powers, the Sen-
ate is not in the policy-making business. The Senate's function is one of
oversight and approval. That is what the Separation of Powers is all
about. To use Hamilton's insightful term from Federalist No. 75, the
treaty-making process represents an "intermixture of powers."'
Two former National Security Advisers from the last decade (one of
them a member of the Tower Commission) have complained that the
Executive Branch is saddled with 535 putative secretaries of state and
defense.52 When does the congressional oversight function give way to
the actual management of foreign affairs? History has demonstrated
that when the President is politically strong, the Congress becomes sub-
servient in the foreign policy field. When a president is weak or when
47. The latest revisionist theories can be found in the recent Senate ABM Treaty
Hearings. See The ABM Treat'y and the Constitution, Joint Hearings before the Comm. on
Foreign Relations and the Comm. on thefidiciarr, S. REP. No. 164, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 33, at 451 (A. Hamilton).
49. Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901).
50. See Treaties and Other International Agreements, A Study Prepared for the
Comm. on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Con-
gress, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 104-18 (June, 1984) (unpublished manuscript).
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 33, at 449-50 (A. Hamilton).
52. Cf Brock, A Regal Battle to Reign, Insight, Aug. 10, 1987, at 10, col. 1; Scrow-
croft Comment, How Can Democracy and Covert Action Be Reconciled?, N.Y. Times, July
26, 1987, at E3 [hereinafter Democracy and Covert Action]. General Scrowcroft is once
again National Security Adviser to the President.
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there is a weakened presidency, the Congress becomes assertive and
seeks to gain control of policy determination.5 3 Samuel P. Huntington,
distinguished Harvard political scientist and a former member of the
National Security Council during the Carter Administration, claims that
the present conduct of American foreign policy involves "a new role of
Congress," which is now "much more active and directive ... "54 The
truth of the matter is that this has been going on for a generation, begin-
ning with the unfolding opposition to the Vietnam War and continuing
down through the wounded presidencies of Nixon, Ford, Carter, and
Reagan. This active and aggressive congressional role makes the "inter-
mixture of powers" a difficult and sometimes dangerous political
brew. 55
II. Conclusion: The Necessity of Presidential Leadership
in Foreign Affairs
The real issue in the 1980's is not the Separation of Powers so much as it
is the allocation of powers. Madison's notes on the debates of the Phila-
delphia Constitutional Convention provide virtually no clues as to the
original intent of the Framers with respect to the conduct of American
foreign relations, 56 and as Hamilton implied in Federalist No. 75, the
plain meaning of the Constitution in this area is not so plain.5 7 Two
authors of a well-received current study of the Constitutional Conven-
tion claim that there was really "no other question on which the Con-
vention was so solidly in agreement as that the power to declare war be
exercised by the Congress, and not the president." 5 8 Nevertheless, this
tells us nothing about the regular conduct of foreign affairs. These same
authors then speculate that the Framers would have been heartily in
favor of the War Powers Resolution, but they provide no evidence for
their opinion. 59
53. See generally LEOPOLD, supra note 36. Cf L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
FLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT (1985); and the famous analysis of
Justice Robert Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
54. Huntington Comment, Democracy and Covert Action, supra note 52, at E3, cols.
2-3. Former Nixon speechwriter, Raymond Price, put it boldly and baldly: "Con-
gress has introduced itself increasingly into the operational responsibilities of the
executive in the conduct of foreign policy." Price, Preserving Liberty in a Hostile World,
The Washington Times, Aug. 27, 1987, at D2, col. 6. Cf. the exasperated lament of
Wall StreetJournal editorialist L. Gordon Crovitz that "[i]nstead of an imperial Pres-
idency, we have an imperial Congress aided by an activist court." The Washington
Times, Jan. 23, 1989, at A7, col. 1.
55. See R. Pious, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 416-22 (1979).
56. See NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, REPORTED BY
JAMES MADISON (A. Koch ed., rev. 1985).
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 33, at 450 (A. Hamilton).
58. C. COLLIER &J.L. COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 330-31 (1987).
59. Id. at 248. For an opposing view, see R. FRIEDLANDER, WAR POWERS AND THE
CONSTITUTION: WHAT DID THE FOUNDERS ACTUALLY INTEND? (Legal Backgrounder,
Washington Legal Foundation) (July 15, 1988).
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Even so tenacious a critic of the role of the Chief Executive in the
evolution of American foreign relations as Professor Raoul Berger of
Harvard University stresses the congressional power of inquiry rather
than the idea of management.60 What the present congressional critics
of the White House, and their journalistic allies, are now attempting to
do is nothing less than to transform the Chief Executive into a Chairman
of the Board with the Congress acting as 535 managing partners in the
business of foreign affairs. 6 1 There may be slight precedent for this in
history, but there is no precedent for this in law,6 2 and there is, cer-
tainly, no precedent for this in the language of the U.S. Constitution.
The President of the United States is the architect of American for-
eign policy and manages the day-to-day conduct of American foreign
relations. Consultation and collaboration with the Congress in the mak-
ing of treaties, the appointment of ambassadors, and in dealing with for-
eign crises are what the Framers had in mind.6 3 The overlapping of
powers does not, and did not, mean the evisceration of powers. The
President leads in the diplomatic arena with the cooperation of Con-
gress, but he nevertheless leads. That is what the Framers meant, and
that is the way the system was designed to work. 64
When the several branches of government are remodeled to a
greater or lesser degree by a particular governmental branch, the Con-
stitution is then reshaped at the nation's risk. That is assuredly some-
thing to think about during this Bicentennial anniversary year of the
launching of the Constitutional Republic, as the current course is being
set for the ship of state under a new presidential administration.
60. R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 108-16 (1974).
61. See, e.g., the analysis contained in Low, Clash Rooted in the Constitution, Insight,
Aug. 10, 1987, at 16-17. Arthur Schlessinger claims that "[t]he Framers envisaged a
partnership in the conduct of foreign affairs with the Congress as senior partner."
Schlessinger, supra note 1.
62. The most powerful statement to the contrary can be found injustice Suther-
land's majority opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936).
63. In reference to the treaty power, John Jay comments in Federalist No. 64: "All
constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial department,
have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature."
THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 33, at 394 (. Jay).
64. The observation of New York Times Columnist Anthony Lewis that "[t]o a
degree quite unforeseen by the Framers of the Constitution, the President has the
initiative in our system .... [plower is centered in the White House," is somewhat
overstated and not altogether accurate. Lewis, Bork on the Presidenoy, N.Y. Times, Aug.
27, 1987, at A27, col. I. Cf Editorial, George Bush's First Crisis, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19,
1989, at F2, col. 1, which asserts that the "constitutional executive power includes
the right to act independently and prudently in foreign policy. . . . It requires that a
president fend off congressional attempts to micromanage the operations of the
White House and of executive agencies."
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